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FOLLOWING REPEAT VIENNA 1804 ACTION SECSTATE SECDEF INFO NATO
BONN LONDON USNMR SHAPE USCINCEUR FEB 28TH

QUOTE

S E C R E T VIENNA 1804

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: FEBRUARY 27 INFORMAL SESSION

WITH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN FEBRUARY 27 INFORMAL SESSION,
ALLIES WERE REPRESENTED BY FRG REP, NETHERLANDS REP,
AND US REP, AND EAST BY SOVIET REPS KHLESTOV AND SMIR-
NOVSKY, GDR REP OESER AND POLISH DEPREP JEDYNAK, SUB-
STITUTING FOR STRULAK, WHO WAS DELAYED IN RETURN
FROM WARSAW. SESSION WAS USEFUL BEGINNING OF MORE IN-
TENSIVE DISCUSSIONS. EASTERN REPS MADE VISIBLE
EFFORT TO ABIDE BY AGREED GROUND RULES TO LIMIT SUBJECT
MATTER OF FIRST SESSION TO ISSUE OF US-SOVIET GROUND
FORCES. THEY WERE BUSINESSLIKE IN TONE AND WELL PREPARED
WITH A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ON THIS TOPIC AND ENGAGED
IN ACTIVE EXCHANGE.

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2. MAIN QUESTIONS RAISED BY EAST WERE (A) HOW LONG ALLIED ENVISAGED IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR PHASE I PROPOSAL WOULD TAKE (HERE SOVIET REPS EMPHASIZED EASTERN DESIRE TO MAINTAIN THEIR PROPOSED 1974-1975 SCHEDULE FOR WITHDRAWALS); (B) QUESTION OF TO WHAT EXTENT US WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE IN UNITS, PLUS NEED TO SPECIFY WITHDRAWN UNITS IN ADVANCE; (C) STORAGE OF EQUIPMENT OF WITHDRAWN US UNITS; AND (D) QUESTION OF WHETHER US AND SOVIET FORCES WOULD BE INCLUDED IN ALLIED SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS. KHLESTOV MADE LONG REJECTION OF ALLIED ARGUMENTS ON GEOGRAPHICAL DISPARITIES. SOVIET REPS CONFIRMED THAT THEIR OVERALL REDUCTION PROPOSALS ALSO PROVIDED FOR REDUCTION OF APPROXIMATELY 17 PERCENT OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES AND OF SOVIET TANKS, BUT DECLINED TO BE DRAWN OUT AS TO WHETHER THEIR FIGURES AND ALLIED PROPOSALS FOR FIRST PHASE SOVIET WITHDRAWALS WERE OF THE SAME ORDER OF MAGNITUDE. SOVIETS COMPLAINED OF LACK OF MUTUALITY IN WESTERN PHASE I PROPOSAL EVEN WHEN CONSIDERED IN ISOLATION. SMIRNOVSKY ONCE AGAIN CHALLENGED ACCURACY OF ALLIED TOTAL FOR GROUND FORCES, CLAIMING THAT FRENCH FORCES HAD BEEN OMITTED. IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE TWO SESSIONS IN THE FOLLOWING WEEK, ON MARCH 4 AND MARCH 7. EASTERN REPS TOOK UNDER ADVISEMENT ALLIED PROPOSAL TO REDUCE NUMBER OF WEEKLY PLENARIES TO ONE. END SUMMARY.

3. US REP OPENED SESSION BY REVIEWING GROUND RULES THAT STATEMENTS MADE BY ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRAM OF EITHER SIDE AND AT THIS STAGE WITHOUT COMMITMENT. HE THOUGHT IT WAS DESIRABLE TO TALK FACTS AND FIGURES TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, AND TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO LIMIT USE OF GENERAL ARGUMENTS AND VIEWPOINTS PUT FORWARD IN THE PLENARIES. US REP THEN PRESENTED TALKING POINTS AGREED BY AD HOC GROUP (TEXT SEPTTEL). HE THEN ASKED FOR EASTERN COMMENTS.

4. IN REPLY SOVIET REP KHLESTOV SAID HE FIRST WISHED TO CONFIRM THAT EASTERN SIDE AGREED THAT PROCEDURAL
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CONSIDERATIONS MENTIONED BY US REP SHOULD BE THE GUIDELINES OF THE PRESENT SUGGESTION. IT WOULD BE THE EASTERN EFFORT TO EXPRESS IDEAS AND CONSIDERATIONS IN ORDER TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. THE DISCUSSIONS WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS DIVERGING FROM OR CHANGING THE POSITION SET FORTH BY BOTH SIDES IN PLENARY STATEMENTS, BUT HE AGREED IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO REPEAT THE ENTIRE CONTENT OF PLENARY

SESSIONS, BECAUSE THIS WOULD EXCLUDE DOING ANYTHING ELSE. PLENARY ARGUMENTS WERE WELL KNOWN AND IF THEY WERE MERELY MENTIONED IN PASSING, IT WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE POSITIONS SET FORTH IN THEM WOULD REMAIN VALID. THEREFORE, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO LIMIT THEIR REPETITION IN THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS IF IT WERE DESIRED TO MAKE THESE SESSIONS CREATIVE.

5. KHLESTOV SAID BEFORE PRESENTING EASTERN COMMENT ON US REP'S REMARKS, HE WOULD LIKE TO ASK SOME QUESTIONS TO CLARIFY THE WESTERN POSITION. THE FIRST WAS IN TERMS OF THE WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, WHAT WAS THE TIMING FORESEEN BY THE ALLIED FOR US AND SOVIET PHASE I REDUCTIONS? WHEN WOULD THEY START AND WHEN WOULD THEY END?

6. US REP SAID HE BELIEVED REDUCTIONS SHOULD START WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD AFTER THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WENT INTO EFFECT. DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTATION WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT TOGETHER BY BOTH SIDES. KHLESTOV SAID US REP WAS TOO CAUTIOUS IN HIS RESPONSE. SOVIETS ASSUMED ALLIES HAD ALREADY THOUGHT OUT THE TIMING OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR OWN PROPOSAL. IN THE EASTERN PROPOSAL, THIS HAD ALL BEEN WORKED OUT IN DETAIL, WITH A START IN 1975 AND THE PROCESS ENDING IN 1977. US REP SAID HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE WITH HIS COLLEAGUES AS YET AND WOULD HAVE TO DO SO BEFORE GIVING A DEFINITIVE REPLY. BUT FROM HIS OWN VIEWPOINT, IF ONE ASSUMED AN AGREEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT IN 1974, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO START IN 1975; IT WAS NOT UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT AN AGREEMENT TO BE WORKED OUT IN THE TIME SCHEDULE MENTIONED BY EAST, I.E., BY THE END OF 1974.

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7. KHLESTOV ASKED IF US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS COULD START IN 1975 UNDER THE ALLIED PHASE I PROPOSAL. US REP SAID IF AGREEMENT WAS REACHED IN 1974, IMPLEMENTATION COULD PROBABLY START IN 1975. ALLIED REPS COULD LOOK INTO THIS QUESTION IF IT WERE IMPORTANT TO EASTERN REPS. KHLESTOV SAID HE WANTED TO GET THE ISSUE CLEAR. IN THE EASTERN APPROACH, THE DESIRE WAS TO START REDUCTIONS IN 1975 AND TO COMPLETE THEM IN 1977. HE WANTED TO FIND OUT WHETHER THE ALLIES HAD THE SAME APPROACH. US REP HAD INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO WORK OUT THIS ISSUE WITH HIS COLLEAGUES. IT WOULD BE GOOD TO HAVE AN ANSWER NOW.

8. NETHERLANDS AND FRG REPS POINTED OUT THAT, ONCE

AGREEMENT WAS REACHED, IMPLEMENTATION WOULD BE A TECHNICAL PROBLEM. FIRST IT WAS NECESSARY TO REACH AGREEMENT. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS PROPOSED BY EAST COULD BE CARRIED OUT RAPIDLY. US REP SAID THAT ONCE AGAIN FROM A PERSONAL VIEWPOINT, HE THOUGHT THAT US COULD REDUCE AS FAST AS SOVIETS. HOWEVER, HE WOULD LIKE TO THINK OVER THE QUESTION AND PRESENT A CONSIDERED VIEW AT A LATER TIME. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO GET CLARITY ON THIS ISSUE AT THE NEXT OCCASION BUT IF POSSIBLE, AT THE PRESENT ONE. SOVIETS SAW A START IN 1975 AND COMPLETION 1977. THE ALLIED POSITION WAS MORE VAGUE. THE SOVIETS WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER OR NOT ALLIES AGREED THAT IMPLEMENTATION COULD START IN 1975 AND END IN 1977. IN REMARK IN RUSSIAN, POLISH DEPREP RAISED ISSUE OF INCLUSION OF NATIONAL FORCES. KHLESTOV AND SMIRNOVSKY INDICATED THIS TOPIC SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR LATER SESSION. GDR REP THEN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD KHLESTOV WAS ASKING ABOUT THE BEGINNING AND CONCLUSION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCE REDUCTIONS. US REP REPLIED THIS HAD BEEN ALLIED UNDERSTANDING OF THE QUESTION. ALLIED REPS WOULD GIVE AN ANSWER ON A FUTURE OCCASION.

9. NETHERLANDS REP SAID ALLIES COULD NOT GIVE A PRECISE ANSWER NOW. THEY HAD NO TARGET DATES. THEY
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HOPED TO IMPLEMENT AN AGREEMENT AS SOON AS ONE COULD BE REACHED. IF AN AGREEMENT COULD BE LIMITED TO US AND SOVIET FORCES, THERE WAS A REASONABLE HOPE TO ACHIEVE IT BY THE END OF 1974 OR BEGINNING OF 1975. BUT IF THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE MADE CUMBERSOME BY THE ADDITION OF OTHER ELEMENTS, IT WOULD TAKE LONGER TO REACH AGREEMENT. THE QUESTION OF HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE TO WITHDRAW 68,000 SOVIET FORCES AND 29,000 US FORCES WAS A TECHNICAL ONE.

10. KHLESTOV SAID THAT THIS ISSUE WAS NOT A PURELY TECHNICAL QUESTION, BUT ONE WHICH HAD TO DO WITH THE ESSENCE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER. US REP ASKED COULD IMPLEMENT WITHIN A YEAR, COULD SOVIETS DO THE SAME? KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT SOVIETS HAD SUGGESTED REDUCTIONS BEGINNING IN 1975 AND COMPLETED IN 1977. THIS WAS THE EASTERN PROGRAM. BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED TO DISCUSS US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS, EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED IT LEGITIMATE TO ASK ALLIED REPS FOR THEIR IDEAS ABOUT TIMING OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR OWN ALLIED PROPOSAL.

11. US REP SAID US COULD PROBABLY IMPLEMENT WITHDRAWALS AS RAPIDLY AS SOVIETS COULD. HOWEVER, THIS WAS A PERSONAL VIEW AND HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO GIVE A CONSIDERED ANSWER ON A FUTURE OCCASION. NETHERLANDS REP SAID IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO FIX A TIME SPAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION BEFORE THE CONCRETE CONTENT OF AN AGREEMENT WAS KNOWN. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT ACCORDING TO THE AGREED GROUND RULES FOR THESE DISCUSSIONS, IT WAS ONLY FAIR FOR EAST TO ASK THE QUESTION IMPLEMENTATION IN TERMS OF THE ALLIED PROGRAM FOR REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES. BUT HE WISHED TO RAISE ANOTHER QUESTION. THE ALLIES HAD SAID THAT AMERICAN FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN EITHER AS INDIVIDUALS OR AS UNITS. WHAT KIND OF UNITS DID WEST HAVE IN MIND?

12. US REP SAID HE COULD NOT ADVANCE SPECIFICS AT THIS TIME, BUT US EXPECTED TO HAVE FREEDOM TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES AS INDIVIDUALS OR AS UNITS. HE COULD NOT GO FURTHER THAN THIS ON THE PRESENT OCCASION. KHLESTOV
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SAID THAT ACCORDING TO WESTERN VIEW, APPARENTLY EACH PARTICIPANT WOULD DECIDE FOR ITSELF WHETHER TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES AS UNITS OR AS INDIVIDUALS. WAS THIS VIEW CORRECT?

13. US REP SAID THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. THE ALLIED PROPOSAL WAS THAT THE US BECAUSE OF THE GREAT GEOGRAPHICAL DISPARITIES INVOLVED SHOULD HAVE THE FREEDOM TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES AS INDIVIDUALS OR IN UNITS. SOVIETS SHOULD WITHDRAW A TANK ARMY.

14. SMIRNOVSKY SAID WEST WISHED SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW A TANK ARMY. WOULD THE WESTERN POSITION MEAN THAT, EVEN AFTER AN AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED, US WOULD RETAIN FREEDOM TO DECIDE AT THAT LATE DATE WHETHER TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES BY UNITS OR AS INDIVIDUALS? POINTS OF THIS KIND SHOULD BE SPECIFIED IN AN AGREEMENT BEFORE IT WAS CONCLUDED.

15. US REP SAID HE THOUGHT SMIRNOVSKY HAD RAISED A FAIR QUESTION WHICH HAD TO BE LOOKED AT FURTHER. KHLESTOV SAID APPARENTLY US REP MEANT IT SHOULD BE DETERMINED BEFOREHAND WHETHER STATES WOULD WITHDRAW BY INDIVIDUALS OR BY UNITS. DID THIS MEAN THAT IN WORKING OUT THE DRAFT OF A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT COVERING THE WITHDRAWALS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES, THE DRAFT WOULD CONTAIN A PROTOCOL STATING WHETHER INDIVIDUALS OR UNITS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AND IDENTIFYING THE UNITS WHICH WOULD BE WITHDRAWN? US REP SAID HE WOULD THINK EACH SIDE

SHOULD INFORM THE OTHER OF WHICH FORCES WOULD BE
WITHDRAWN INCLUDING LOCATIONS FROM AND TO WHICH MOVEMENTS
WOULD OCCUR SO THIS COULD BE KNOWN FOR VERIFICATION

16. FRG REP SAID IT WAS CLEAR ALLIES WISHED TO
WITHDRAW A SOVIET TANK ARMY. US FORCES WOULD BE
WITHDRAWN AS INDIVIDUALS OR IN UNITS AND THEIR WITH-
DRAWAL WOULD BE SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION. SMIRNOVSKY
SAID THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO KNOW BEFOREHAND WHAT UNITS WOULD
BE WITHDRAWN NOT MERELY INFORMED AFTER THE FACT THAT
CERTAIN UNITS HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN. SOVIETS WANTED
TO AGREE BEFOREHAND ON PRECISELY WHICH UNITS WOULD
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BE WITHDRAWN. KHLESTOV SAID THAT A PROTOCOL ATTACHED
TO THE MAIN AGREEMENT SHOULD SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFY
THE UNITS TO BE WITHDRAWN. HOW DID THE US FORESEE
DESIGNATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS TO BE WITHDRAWN?
THIS DID NOT SEEM PRACTICAL.

17 US REP SAID THIS ISSUE WOULD BE DEALT WITH THROUGH AN AGREE-
MENT TO LIMIT THE LEVEL OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES REMAINING
IN THE AREA SMIRNOVSKY SAID IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO VERIFY
THE WITHDRAWAL OF INDIVIDUALS. US REP SAID WITHDRAWAL OF UNITS
WAS EASIER TO VERIFY BUT METHODS COULD BE WORKED OUT TO
VERIFY THAT EXISTING MANPOWER CEILINGS WERE BEING RESPECTED.
KHLESTOV ASKED WHETHER CEILINGS WOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR
US AND SOVIET FORCES. US REP SAID YES. KHLESTOV
SAID THAT APPARENTLY ACCORDING TO WESTERN PROPOSALS,
FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES,
NEITHER US NOR THE USSR WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO
BRING NEW FORCES INTO THE AREA. US REP SAID IT SEEMED
OVBIOUS THAT A LIMITATION SHOULD BE PLACED ON THE
REMAINING FORCES. KHLESTOV ASKED WHETHER THERE WOULD
BE EXCEPTIONS TO THIS LIMITATION. US REP SAID THE
ALLIES WOULD SOON ADVANCE SPECIFIC VIEWS ON THIS
TOPIC BUT IT WOULD SEEMEVIDENT THAT BOTH US AND SOVIETS
WOULD NEED EXCEPTIONS BECAUSE OF CURRENT MILITARY PRACTICES
INCLUDING SOVIET REPLACEMENT PRACTICE. MOREOVER, EACH
SIDE BROUGHT IN FORCES FOR EXERCISES FOR WHICH EX-
CEPTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE DEFINED FOR A TEMPORARY
PERIOD. KHLESTOV ASKED WHETHER THE EXCEPTIONS WOULD
BE LIMITED AS REGARDS NUMBERS AND TIMING. US REP SAID
THIS WOULD BE THE CASE. FRG REP COMMENTED HE HAD
EXPLAINED THIS POINT IN THE LAST PLENARY PRESENTATION.
ONE OF THE STABILIZING MEASURES ALLIES HAD PROPOSED
WAS INTENDED TO BRING THESE EXCEPTIONS UNDER CONTROL
AND REGULATED IN SUCH A WAY THAT NO CONCERN OR
AMBIGUITY WOULD BE CAUSED. ALLIES WOULD HAVE MORE
DETAILS ON THIS TOPIC LATER. KHLESTOV SAID FRG REP

WAS APPARENTLY REFERRING ONLY TO FORCES MOVING INTO THE AREA. FRG REP REPLIED THIS WAS ONLY ONE ALLIED STABILIZING MEASURE: ALLIES HAD OTHERS.

18. KHLESTOV THEN NOTED THAT WESTERN PROPOSAL PER-
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MITTED US TO STORE HEAVY EQUIPMENT. IT WAS ASSUMED THAT THIS MEANT TANKS. WHAT ABOUT OTHER TYPES OF EQUIPMENT? HELICOPTERS, HEAVY GUNS, AND SO FORTH? WOULD THESE BE STORED BY THE US ALSO?

19. US REP SAID ALL HEAVY EQUIPMENT WOULD BE STORED. US HAD IN MIND UNIT EQUIPMENT, TRUCKS, TANKS AND BIG GUNS KHLESTOV ASKED WHETHER MEANT ALL EQUIPMENT INCLUDING MACHINE GUNS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF RIFLES AND UNIFORMS COULD BE STORED. US REP SAID THIS WAS CORRECT APPRECIATION.

20. US REP NOTED THAT, ACCORDING TO ALLIED COMPUTATION, IT APPEARED THAT THE EASTERN APPROACH CALLS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF 78,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS AND 33,000 AMERICAN SOLDIERS. AS EASTERN REPS KNEW THE WESTERN PHASE I PROPOSAL CALLS -- AMONG OTHER THINGS -- FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF 68,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS AND 29,000 AMERICAN SOLDIERS. DID EASTERN REPS AGREE THAT -- AT LEAST AS REGARDS REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET SOLDIERS -- THE MANGITUDE OF REDUCTIONS ENVISAGED UNDER THE PROPOSALS WHICH HAVE BEEN ADVANCED WAS NOT TOO DISSIMILAR?

21. GDR REP SAID HE WANTED TO ASK A COUNTER QUESTION. WAS THE US FIGURE OF 29,000 THE FINAL NUMBER OF US FORCES TO BE REDUCED? US REP SAID YES, THIS WAS PHASE I REDUCTION. GDR REP ASKED WHETHER MORE US FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED IN PHASE II. US REP SAID ALLIES HAD GIVEN THE OVERALL DIMENSIONS OF THEIR REDUCTION PROGRAM DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A COMMON CEILING. ALLIES COULD NOT GO BEYOND THAT POINT IN THEIR DELIBERATIONS. US DEPREP SAID US REDUCTIONS WOULD BE 29,000, AS SET FOR IN ALLIED PHASE I PROPOSAL. ALLIES HAD IN ADDITION SAID THAT ON ALLIED SIDE, SECOND PHASE WOULD FORCUS ON FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. SMIRNOVSKY ASKED WHAT THE PHRASE "ON THE ALLIED SIDE" MEANT. US REP SAID HE COULD SAY NO MORE THAN WHAT HE HAD SAID ON THIS SUBJECT. SMIRNOVSKY OBSERVED THAT ACCORDING TO THE ALLIED PLAN THERE WOULD NOT IN ANY EVENT BE MANY ALLIED FORCES LEFT FOR
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REDUCTION IN PHASE II; ALLIED REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II WOULD THEREFORE NOT BE VERY CONSIDERABLE. ALLIED REPS SAID THESE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE ABOUT 48,000 MEN.

2. US REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO RETURN TO HIS QUESTION OF WHETHER THE MANGNITUDES ENVISAGED FOR US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES REDUCTIONS ON BOTH SIDES WERE SIMILAR.

23. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE AN ANSWER THIS QUESTION AND EXPRESS SOME OF THE EASTERN VIEWS ON THE ALLIED PRESENTATION. FIRST, SOVIETS WERE READY WITHIN THE EASTERN SCHEME TO CONSIDER ALL ELEMENTS OF REDUCTIONS. THAT WAS TO SAY, THEY WERE WILLING TO DISCUSS AND TO ANALYZE ANYTHING WHICH WOULD BE CONSIDERED AN ACCEPTABLE MUTUAL BASIS FOR REDUCTION. SO IF PARTICIPANTS WERE TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS WITH RESPECT TO US-SOVIET FORCES, SOVIETS WERE READY TO DISCUSS THIS ALSO. (COMMENT: AT THIS TIME A SIDE DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE WITH SMIRNOVSKY, WHO APPARENTLY FELT THAT KHLESTOV HAD CREATED AN IMPRESSION OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS. END COMMENT.) KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION FOR REDUCTIONS COULD BE FOUND ONLY THROUGH TAKING ACCOUNT OF ALL ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES. EVEN THOUGH GROUND RULES OF THIS SESSION PREVENTED DISCUSSING THESE OTHER ELEMENTS, IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT THE METHOD OF REDUCTIONS AND OF FIGURES USED SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE WHOLE PICTURE. THIS WAS WHY STATEMENTS THAT PERCENTAGES OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE THIS OR THAT DID NOT REALLY HIT THE MARK. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE POSTURE AND THE PRESENT MIX OF FORCES FOR BOTH SIDES HAD BEEN DETERMINED BY BOTH SIDES DURING THE PERIOD OF BUILD-UP OF THE PRESENT FORCES.

24. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT EAST COULD NOT ACCEPT WESTERN CONCEPT OF GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS. ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, US REP HAD MENTIONED THE GENERAL REINFORCEMENT CAPACITY OF BOTH SIDES. IF THIS WERE TO BE CONSIDERED, ONE SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL RELEVANT FACTORS INCLUDING PERSONNEL,

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ROADS AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND EVERYTHING CONNECTED WITH THE SUBJECT. THAT IS WHY THE SOVIETS THOUGHT THAT THE WESTERN APPROACH AIMED AT ONLY REDUCTION OF

US AND SOVIET FORCES WAS NOT JUSTIFIED. HE BELIEVED PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TRY TO FIND FAIRER FORMS OF REDUCTIONS WHICH MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS.

25. US REP SAID HE UNDELSTOOD VIEWS EXPRESSED BY KHLESTOV, BUT THAT HE WOULD LIKE AN ANSWER TO HIS QUESTION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE GENERAL DIMENSIONS OF US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS FORESEEN FOR BOTH SIDES WERE SIMILAR.

26. KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT, AS FAR AS PERCENTAGES WERE CONCERNED, THE EASTERN PROPOSAL PROVIDED FOR A REDUCTION OF 17 PERCENT OF ALL FORCES IN THREE STAGES. US REP SAID THAT, IN THAT CASE, WESTERN FIGURES FOR GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS MUST BE ABOUT RIGHT. KHLESTOV SAID THAT GIVEN REDUCTION OF ALL ARMED FORCES AS A BACKGROUND, 17 PERCENT OF GROUND FORCES WAS CORRECT AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE FORCES TO BE REDUCED. BUT OF COURSE, THIS ANSWER WAS BASED ON THE EASTERN APPROACH WHICH INCLUDED REDUCTION OF BOTH FOREIGN AND NATIONAL FORCES AS WELL AS NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES. THE SITUATION BECAME DIFFERENT WHEN ONE ELEMENT WAS PLUCKED OUT FROM THE WHOLE.

27. US REP ASKED WHETHER HE WAS RIGHT THAT 17 PERCENT OF 460,000 SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA WAS 78,000 AND WHETHER BOTH SIDES COULD AGREE ON THIS FIGURE. KHLESTOV SAID THAT AT THIS STAGE HE WOULD NOT COMMENT ON US REP'S ARITHMETIC. GDR REP SAID THAT ALLIED FIGURES WERE NOT CLEAR SINCE IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN THE SECOND PHASE. KHLESTOV ASKED WHETHER IT WAS FAIR TO CONCLUDE THAT US AND SOVIET FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED ONLY IN THE FIRST PHASE OF THE ALLIED TWO PHASE PROGRAM.

28. US REP SAID ALLIES HAD MENTIONED THAT ON THE ALLIED SIDE THE SECOND PHASE WOULD FOCUS ON THE FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND THAT THEY HAD
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GIVEN AN OVERALL FIGURE OF REDUCTIONS FOR BOTH SIDES. THIS SHOULD SUFFICE.

29. GDR REP SAID IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO KNOW THE TOTAL DIMENSIONS OF PROPOSED US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN ORDER TO MAKE A FAIR ASSESSMENT OF WESTERN PROPOSAL. FRG REP SAID PARTICIPANTS WERE ONLY IN THE FIRST PHASE. QUESTIONS OF THIS KIND WERE PREMATURE.

30. US REP SAID ALLIES HAD ALSO TOLD EASTERN REPS THAT,

AGAIN ACCORDING TO ALLIED COMPUTATION, IT APPEARS THAT THE EASTERN APPROACH CALLS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF 1,500 SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS. WAS THIS A CORRECT ASSUMPTION? THE PROPOSAL THE WEST HAS MADE CALLS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF 1,700 SOVIET TANKS. DID THE EAST AGREE THAT THOSE FIGURES WERE WITHIN THE SAME GENERAL ORDER OF MAGNITUDE?

31. KHESTOV SAID IN REPLY TO US REP'S FIRST QUESTION THAT IT WAS CORRECT THAT SOVIETS WOULD WITHDRAW 17 PER CENT OF THEIR TANKS, BUT ONLY IN FRAMEWORK OF A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT COVERING ALL FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, BUT NOT IF ONE ITEM OF EQUIPMENT WERE HANDLED IN ISOLATION.

32. KHESTOV CONTINUED THAT ON BASIS OF WHAT ALLIED REPS HAD SAID ABOUT TIMING OF PHASES, ALLIES WERE VAGUE ABOUT WHETHER US AND SOVIET FORCES WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE SECOND PHASE OR NOT. IT WOULD BE ONE SITUATION IF US AND SOVIET FORCES WERE REDUCED IN THE FIRST PHASE, BUT NOT THE SECOND. IT WOULD BE A CLEARLY DIFFERENT SITUATION IF THEY WERE INCLUDED IN BOTH PHASES. HE RAISED THIS QUESTION TO ASK ALLIED REPS TO THINK IT OVER AND TO REPLY WITH A SPECIFIC POSITION ON THIS.

33. US REP SAID HE THOUGHT DISCUSSION SHOULD GET BACK TO PRACTICAL DETAILS. HE ASKED IF IT WERE TRUE THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAINTAINED TWO TANK ARMIES IN THE GDR: NAMELY, THE THIRD SHOCK ARMY AND THE FIRST GUARDS TANK ARMY.

34. KHESTOV REPLIED THAT SINCE ALLIES HAD MENTIONED
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THIS POINT IN PLENARY STATEMENTS, SOVIETS ASSUMED THAT ALLIES WERE SURE OF THE FACTS AND THEREFORE THAT SOVIET REP SHOULD BELIEVE ALLIES. THIS ISSUE WOULD NOT APPEAR ANY PROBLEM TO HIM. SMIRNOVSKY ASKED WHETHER SOVIETS WERE CORRECT IN ASSUMING THAT THE FRENCH FORCES WERE INCLUDED IN ALLIED FIGURES. WHAT WOULD BE ALLIED REDUCTION IF THEY WERE?

35. FRG REP SAID FRENCH WERE INCLUDED IN BOTH ALLIED 777,000 TOTAL AND IN SUGGESTED 700,000 COMMON CEILING FIGURE. SMIRNOVSKY SAID SOVIETS DOUBTED FRENCH WERE INCLUDED IN TOTAL ALLIED GROUND FORCE STRENGTH OF 777,000 US REP SAID ALLIES WOULD BE GLAD TO GO OVER THE FIGURES JOINTLY WITH THE SOVIETS. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THE STAGE HAD NOT YET COME TO DO THIS, BUT ALLIES SHOULD CHECK AND ASSURE THAT THE FRENCH WERE INCLUDED IN THE FIGURE. ALLIED REPS ASSURED SMIRNOVSKY THAT FRENCH FORCES WERE

INCLUDED BEYOND ANY DOUBT AND SAID THEY WOULD CONFIRM THIS
ONCE MORE.

36. US REP SAID THAT HE WANTED TO AKS KHLESTOV
A FURTHER QUESTION, WHETHER THE FACT THAT THE US
WAS FARTHER AWAY FROM THE REDUCTION AREA THAN THE USSR
WAS NOT BOUND TO CAUSE AN AGREEMENT WHICH
REQUIRES BOTH SIDES TO TAKE THEIR WITHDRAWN FORCES
BACK TO THEIR HOMELANDS TO HAVE UNEQUAL IMPACT ON
THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. SOVIET REP
ASKED IN RETURN WHETHER
USREP WOULD AGREE WITH HIM THAT, IN RAISING THE QUESTION
OF REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY, THIS CONCEPT SHOULD
TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL MILITARY ELEMENTS OF EACH BORDER
OF EACH COUNTRY TO BE INVOLVED.

37. US REP SAID HE WAS SPEAKING ONLY OF THE POSSIBLE RETURN
OF THE WITHDRAWN FORCES. KHLESTOV SAID ALLIES HAD DELIBERATELY
SELECTED ONLY ONE OF A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS, AND TOOK
IT IN ISOLATION, AND THEN IDENTIFIED A DISCREPANCY IN
IT. THE EASTERN APPROACH WAS THAT ALL ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE
SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. HE BELIEVED EASTERN APPROACH
OF TAKING ACCOUNT OF ALL FACTORS WAS THE RIGHT ONE.
US REP SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
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THE REAL SITUATION. THE SOVIET UNION HAD NUMEROUS
ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF LAND AND AREA COMMUNICATIONS INTO
THE REDUCTIONS AREAM THE SOVIET UNION HAD GREATER
TROOP REINFORCEMENT CAPACITY THAN THE UNITED STATES.
SOVIET REPS SAID THAT, IN THIS CASE ONE SHOULD CALCULATE
ALL MEANS OF TRANSPORT OF BOTH SIDES, CARGO PLANES,
SIZE OF NAVY AND MERCHANT MARINE FLEETS, ETC. GDR
REP SAID THE QUESTION ALSO RAISE THE ISSUE OF NATIONAL
FORCES AND THEIR MOBILIZATION CAPACITY.

38. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT, AS A GENERAL OBSERVATION, PARTICIPANTS
HOPED TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD AVOID
SITUATIONS WHERE REINFORCEMENT WOULD BE NECESSARY.
IT WAS TRUE THAT THE UNITED STATES IN WITHDRAWING
WOULD BE MOVING ITS FORCES FURTHER THAN THE SOVIET UNION
WOULD. BUT FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF MILITARY SECURITY,
THE UNITED STATES WAS BETTER OFF THAN THE USSR SINCE
IN WAS FURTHER AWAY FROM THE AREA THAN THE USSR AND
CONSEQUENTLY MORE SECURE. THIS POINT TOO SHOULD BE TAKEN
INTO ACCOUNT. IF THE WORST HAPPENED, THE QUESTION OF
BRINGING IN REINFORCEMENTS INTO THE AREA WOULD BE
AC COMPLICATED ONE INVOLVING A WIDE RANGE OF ELEMENTS.
THIS WAS NOT A SIMPLE ISSUE INVOLVING A SINGLE DIMEN-
SION. ALL ELEMENTS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION.

DISTANCE WAS ONE FACTOR, BUT ONLY ONE, AND THERE WERE OTHERS WHICH ALSO WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. SMIRNOVSKY CONTINUED THAT IF A TROOP REDUCTION AGREEMENT WERE REACHED, THE SOVIET S

WOULD WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES TO THEIR WESTERN BORDER. HOWEVER, ALLIES APPEARED TO BE ARGUING THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD RETIRE THEIR FORCES TO THE SAME DISTANCE FROM THE STARTING POINT AS THE UNITED STATES, BRING THE SOVIET FORCES INTO THE EASTERN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION.

39. FRG REP SAID THAT IT WAS TRUE THAT THE UNITED STATES, BEING SEPARATE FROM EUROPE, MIGHT BE SECURE FROM SURPRISE ATTACK BUT PARTICIPANTS WERE SPEAKING OF THE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF THE REDUCTION AREA. HERE THE DISTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE. IT WAS EVIDENT THAT A DIVISION FORCE IN THE WESTERN SECRET

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PART OF THE SOVIET UNION HAD A MORE IMPORTANT EFFECT FOR THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS THAN A DIVISION IN THE EASTERN PART OF THE UNITED STATES. IT WAS TRUE THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS WISHED TO ACHIEVE A SITUATION WHERE THERE WAS NO NEED FOR REINFORCEMENTS WOULD ARISE. BUT PARTICIPANTS ALSO HAD TO ASSURE THAT IF ONE SIDE BROKE THE AGREEMENT, IT WOULD NOT HAVE AN UNJUSTIFIED ADVANTAGE.

40. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THE OBJECT OF FORMULATING AN AGREEMENT WAS TO PROVIDE MORE SECURITY, NOT TO FIGURE OUT WHAT TO DO IN CASE OF VIOLATION. FRG REP SAID THE POINT WAS NOT TO CREATE A SITUATION WHICH WOULD BE A TEMPTATION TO BREAK THE AGREEMENT. GDR REP SAID THE OBJECTIVE WAS THE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WHETHER OR NOT THEY WERE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

NETHERLANDS REP SAID THE AGREEMENT DEALT WITH CENTRAL EUROPE AND THIS IS WHERE THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY HAD ITS MOST DIRECT APPLICATION. FRG REP SAID THAT THE ALLIES WANTED TO MAINTAIN UNDIMINISHED SECURITY IN THE REDUCTION AREA IN A WAY WHICH WOULD NOT DIMINISH SECURITY OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS.

41. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO SUMMARIZE THE DISCUSSION OF GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS. EAST DID NOT SHARE ALLIED EVALUATION THAT GEOGRAPHY SHOULD PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN REDUCTIONS. ALLIED ARGUMENTS WERE ARTIFICIAL AND WERE CREATED MERELY TO ADVANCE ALLIES INTEREST IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. BY AGREEMENT, NEGOTIATIONS FOCUSED ON CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE FORCES WITHIN THAT AREA. THE ALLIES HAD BROUGHT UP THE HYPOTHETICAL CASE OF A MILITARY BUILDUP IN THIS AREA OF REDUCTIONS. HOWEVER, THE PROBLEM OF A MILITARY BUILDUP IN ANY AREA COMPRISED MANY FACTORS. A MILITARY BUILDUP IN CENTRAL EUROPE COULD INCLUDE MOVEMENT OF FORCES INTO THE AREA,

BUT ALSO THE MOBILIZATION OF FORCES WITHIN THE AREA. IF THE FUTURE AGREEMENT CONTAINED A PROVISION AGAINST ENTRY OF ADDITIONAL SOLDIERS INTO THE AREA, TO BRING ADDITIONAL FORCES IN WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT. THEREFORE, THE PROBLEM OF A MILITARY BUILDUP IN THE AREA WOULD OCCUR ONLY IN THE EXTRA-ORDINARY CASE WHERE ALL ASPECTS OF BUILDUP WOULD BE INVOLVED. IN SUCH AN INSTANCE, THERE WOULD BE A BUILDUP OF ALL THE MILITARY BLOCS WITHIN EUROPE. IF ONE WERE TRYING TO EVALUATE THIS PARTICULAR POSSIBILITY, IT WOULD OF COURSE BE NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE MOBILIZATION FACTORS OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, AND NOT ONLY GEORGRA
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A
PHIC FACTORS. THE CAPABILITIES OF ALL NATO COUNTRIES AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES DIFFERED IN THIS RESPECT. THEREFORE TO EVALUATE A POSSIBLE BUILDUP IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE MOBILIZATION CAPABILITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS, ESPECIALLY THE BUNDESWEHR, THEIR INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL, THEIR MILITARY RESERVE STOCK, THE TERRITORIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BUNDESWEHR, AND A WHOLE MASS OF OTHER FACTORS THE SAME ANALYSIS WOULD HAVE TO BE CARRIED OUT FOR NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM, AND A MASS OF MORE DATA ADDED ON THE RESPECTIVE CAPABILITIES OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, POLAND AND THE GDR. IT WOULD ALSO BE NECESSARY TO MEASURE THE PRODUCTION OF AMMUNITION AND LOGISTICS. ALL RELEVANT FACTORS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THEREFORE, IF A MILITARY BUILDUP WERE TO BE THE SUBJECT OF STUDY, ONE SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT NOT ONLY THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS.

42. KHLESTOV SAID THAT THESE REMARKS MADE IT EVIDENT THAT TO INCLUDE STUDY OF THIS COMPLEX ISSUE WOULD DETRACT FROM THE WORK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE BASIC ASSUMPTION SHOULD BE THAT WHATEVER WERE REACHED WOULD BE OBSERVED BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE ALLIES HAD SOUGHT TO EMPHASIZE THE DIFFICULTIES AND COMPLICATIONS WHICH WOULD BE CAUSED BY TRYING TO NEGOTIATE REDUCTIONS OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM THE OUTSET. IT WOULD BE FAR MORE DIFFICULT TO CONSIDER REDUCTIONS OF GROUND FORCES IF THE ALLIES INSISTED ON BRINGING THIS BUILDUP ISSUE INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS SINCE BY THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM THE PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE OBLIGED TO TAKE MANY OTHER COMPLEX FACTORS INTO CONSIDERATION. THEREFORE, IN THE PROCESS OF WORKING OUT AN AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND WHILE INTENSIVELY CONSIDERING THE SPECIAL CASE OF GROUND FORCES, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOT CONSIDER THIS ARTIFICIAL FACTOR OF GEOGRAPHY. PARTICIPANTS SHOULD DEPART FROM THIS POSITION HE HAD JUST DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES.

43. FRG REP SAID THAT IF AGREEMENTS WERE CONCLUDED, THE ASSUMPTION WOULD BE THAT THEY WOULD BE MAINTAINED, BUT IN NO COUNTRY WAS MILITARY PLANNING BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT

ALL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS WOULD BE MAINTAINED. IT WAS UNAVOID-
ABLE THAT MILITARY PLANNING WAS BASED, NOT ON INTENTIONS, BUT
ON CAPABILITIES. IF SOVIET MILITARY PLANNERS ASSUMED THAT ALL
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INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS WOULD BE MAINTAINED UP TO AND
INCLUDING THE UN CHARTER, THEN WHY DID THE SOVIET UNION MAINTAIN
SUCH LARGE FORCES?

44. NETHERLANDS REP SAID PARTICIPANTS WERE SPEAKING TO
THE HYPOTHESIS THAT US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES WOULD BE WITH-
DRAWN. IF THIS WERE DONE AND AN EMERGENCY SITUATION SHOULD
ARISE, EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WOULD LOOK TO THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HAD
WITHDRAWN FORCES TO RETURN THEM. THEREFORE, THE GEOGRAPHIC
FACTOR WAS IMPORTANT FOR A COUNTRY LIKE THE NETHERLANDS. NETHERLANDS
WOULD EXPECT AND DESIRE US FORCES TO RETURN. PRESUMABLY WARSAW
PACT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA WOULD WISH SOVIET FORCES TO RETURN
IN SUCH AN INSTANCE. THE ADVANTAGE IN THIS CASE WOULD
CLEARLY BE TO THE WARSAW PACT. SO ALLIES WERE LEGITIMATELY SEEKING
CERTAIN COMPENSATION IN THIS REGARD. IF SOVIET AND AMERICAN
TROOP WITHDRAWALS WERE UNDER CONSIDERATION, THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR
MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THE DANGER OF VIOLATION MIGHT BE
REMOTE, BUT THOSE WHO FORMULATED THE AGREEMENT MUST BE IN A
POSITION TO SHOW THEIR PARLIAMENTS THAT THEY HAD TAKEN THIS
POSSIBILITY FULLY INTO ACCOUNT.

45. FRG REP SAID IT WAS A SIMPLE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACT THAT
THE REASON WHY NATO HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED WAS THAT WESTERN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BELIEVED THE PRESENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL US FORCES
WAS A VITAL CONTRIBUTION TO THEIR SECURITY.
SMIRNOVSKY SAID THIS MEANT FRG REALLY DIDN'T WANT ANY
REDUCTIONS. FRG REP SAID THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. FRG
WISHED UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES. GDR
REP SAID THAT BOTH US AND USSR WOULD STILL BE IN THE
REAL WORLD IF THEIR FORCES WERE WITHDRAWN. REALISTICALLY,
IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY TO CONSIDER THE RAPIDLY MOBILIZING
BUNDESWEHR RESERVES. REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE ON AN EQUAL
FOOTING FOR BOTH SIDES.

46. SMIRNOVSKY REPEATED THAT IN HIS VIEW THE FRG WOULD REALLY
PREFER NO REDUCTIONS. HE SAID ALL PARTICIPANTS UNDERSTOOD THAT
AGREEMENT COULD ONLY BE REACHED ON A MUTUAL BASIS. FROM WHAT
EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD HEARD IN THIS FIRST SESSION OF THE
DISCUSSION OF US-SOVIET GROUND FORCES, THEY DID NOT THUS
FAR DETECT A MUTUALITY OF INTEREST AS REGARDS US AND SOVIET
REDUCTIONS. EASTERN REPS HAD RAISED ISSUE OF TIMING AND HAD
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SUGGESTED THREE YEARS. ALLIES REPS SAID THEY WOULD THINK ABOUT THIS ISSUE. ALLIED REPS HAD MENTIONED SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE EASTERN AND WESTERN PROPOSALS AS REGARDS US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES. WAS TIMING ALSO A SIMILARITY? THE WESTERN APPROACH ALSO PROVIDED THAT OTHERS WOULD PARTICIPATE. SUPERFICIALLY AT LEAST, THERE WERE SOME SIMILARITIES IF ONE ISOLATED THE ISSUE OF US-SOVIET GROUND FORCES PURELY FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES. THERE SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE A MORE BALANCED APPROACH. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE PRESENT ALLIED APPROACH TO THIS ISSUE EVEN IF TAKEN IN ISOLATION SHOWED MUTUAL RESPECT FOR THE SECURITY OF ALL.

47. US REP SAID EASTERN REPS SHOULD CONSIDER THE OVERALL PROGRAM OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. THE ALLIES HAD SUGGESTED EQUALITY OF GROUND FORCES AND A COMMON CEILING. IN ORDER TO GET TO THIS POINT, SOME WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE MORE THAN OTHERS. THE ALLIED FIRST PHASE I REDUCTION PACKAGE WAS THE FIRST STEP IN A MOVE TOWARDS EQUALITY. SMIRNOVSKY REFERRED TO US REP'S REMARKS THAT AFTER REDUCTIONS PROPOSED BY ALLIES, EAST WOULD STILL HAVE FORCES SUFFICIENT FOR ITS DEFENSE. HE SAID ALLIES DID NOT ACCEPT EASTERN JUDGMENT ON HOW MUCH THE ALLIES NEEDED FOR THEIR OWN SECURITY. WHY SHOULD EAST ACCEPT ALLIED EVALUATION?

48. US REP SAID POINT WAS LEGITIMATE ONE. BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, WHY SHOULD EAST WORRY ABOUT A REDUCTION WHERE IT WOULD STILL HAVE A MARGIN OF 2.3 TO 1 IN TANKS AFTER THE PROPOSED WITHDRAWALS? IT WAS FOR THE EAST TO DECIDE WHAT IT NEEDED FOR ITS OWN SECURITY, BUT THE QUESTION WAS SURELY A FAIR ONE.

49. SMIRNOVSKY SAID EAST COULD ANSWER THIS QUESTION NOW, BUT HAD ALREADY ARGUED THE POINT IN PLENARIES. WHY DIDN'T THE WEST INCLUDE ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

50. KHESTOV SAID THAT THE PRESENT EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS HAD AGAIN INDICATED THAT BOTH SIDES AGAIN HAD A DIFFERENT EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION. FOR EXAMPLE, BOTH HAD A DIFFERENT EVALUATION OF THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR. IT WOULD BE EASY TO GIVE MANY EXAMPLES WHERE THERE WERE DIFFERENT VIEWPOINTS. THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE MAKING A SINCERE EFFORT TO UNDERSTAND THE WESTERN VIEWS AND BELIEVED WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE DOING THE SAME. HE DOUBTED
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WHETHER EITHER SIDE WOULD BE ABLE TO PROVE TO OTHER SIDE THE CORRECTNESS OF MANY VIEWS EXPRESSED. THE DIFFERENCES IN MANY OF THE CONCEPTS WERE FUNDAMENTAL. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, HE BELIEVED IT WAS PROBABLY USEFUL TO FOCUS ON EFFORTS TO SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS AND TO PUT

SOME OF THE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW ASIDE IN ORDER TO GET TO A COMMON BASIS. THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE CONSIDERING REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN GROUND FORCES WITH DUE ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT REDUCTION OF OTHER FORCES WOULD BE CONSIDERED. AS EASTERN PARTICIPANTS UNDERSTOOD IT, BY AGREEMENT, ALLIED REPS WERE PRESENTING ONLY THOSE FACTORS WHICH HAD TO DO WITH US-SOVIET GROUND FORCES ON THE PRESENT OCCASION. BUT EVEN WITHIN THIS NARROW FRAMEWORK, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD SEEK COMMON ELEMENTS IN THE APPROACH OF BOTH SIDES. PARTICIPANTS COULD DISCUSS THIS ASPECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TRY TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS AS REGARDED IT. BUT EASTERN PARTICIPANTS DEPARTED FROM THE FACT THERE SHOULD BE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE APPROACH EQUAL IN QUANTITY AND QUALITY FOR BOTH SIDES. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO TERM FAIR A PROPOSAL WHICH CALLED FOR THE REDUCTION OF 1700 SOVIET TANKS AND ZERO AMERICAN TANKS. A MORE REALISTIC APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM WAS NEEDED. THE FACT SHOULD ALSO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE ALLIES WANTED TO REDUCE A GREATER NUMBER OF SOVIET FORCES WHILE SPEAKING OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS. IT WASN'T FAIR TO TAKE THE AMERICAN-SOVIET GROUND FORCE COMPONENT AND SEPARATE IT FROM OTHER ARMED FORCES IN THE REGION. IF EAST SHOULD TRY TO APPLY THE SAME APPROACH TO THE GROUND FORCES OF THE FRG AND THE GDR, THE FRG REP WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS. IF PARTICIPANTS WERE CONSIDERING ONE ISOLATED COMPONENT, THEY SHOULD FIND A MORE EQUITABLE AND JUST APPROACH TO IT. THIS WOULD BE NECESSARY IF PARTICIPANTS WANTED TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE APPROACH.

51. US REP SAID IF EASTERN REPS HAD ANY SUGGESTIONS IN THIS REGARD, ALLIES WOULD BE INTERESTED TO HEAR THEM. NETHERLANDS REP SAID SOVIET REP HAD JUST REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSIDERING ISOLATED ELEMENTS. DID THIS MEAN SOVIET REP SAW A POSSIBILITY OF DEALING WITH THE ISSUE IN A CERTAIN SEQUENCE, WITH US-SOVIET FORCES FIRST ON A BASIS TO BE AGREED, AND THEN PASSING ON TO REDUCTION OF OTHER FORCES? WOULD SOVIET REP THINK THIS A THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY?

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52. KHLESTOV RESPONDED THAT PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED TO START WITH CONSIDERATION OF US-SOVIET GROUND FORCES. IF IT PROVED POSSIBLE TO FIND A SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM ALONE, THAT WOULD BE GOOD. IF A COMMON COURSE COULD BE FOUND IN THIS AREA, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE. BUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION FOR ALL ELEMENTS WOULD BE NEEDED IN ADDITION. NETHERLANDS REP ASKED WHAT ABOUT A FIRST PHASE ON NEGOTIATIONS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES FOLLOWED BY A SECOND ON THE FORCES OF OTHERS. SMIRNOVSKY ASKED WHETHER TRYING TO CLARIFY ALLIED VIEWS, WOULD IT FOLLOW FROM THE DISCUSSION THUS FAR THAT REDUCTIONS OF OTHER FORCES WOULD FOLLOW IN THE SECOND PHASE. WHEN WOULD THAT PHASE TAKE PLACE?

53. US REP SAID REDUCTIONS COULD START AS SOON AS AGREEMENT WENT INTO EFFECT. ALLIED IMPLEMENTATION WOULD BE AS FAST AS EASTERN IMPLEMENTATION. HE HOPED THAT WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES COULD TAKE PLACE IN A SHORTER TIME THAN THE THREE YEARS INDICATED IN THE SOVIET PROGRAM. SMIRNOVSKY COMMENTED THAT AS

REGARDS THE ALLIED APPROACH, APPARENTLY THE ALLIES DID NOT ENVISAGE PASSING ON TO THE REDUCTION OF THE FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS UNTIL AFTER US-SOVIET WITHDRAWALS HAD BEEN COMPLETED.

54. FRG REP SAID THIS WAS CORRECT. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE EASTERN APPROACH WAS MUCH MORE COMPLICATED. IF IT WERE FOLLOWED, IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO MEET THE EASTERN TIMETABLE FOR AN AGREEMENT BY THE END OF 1974. THIS WAS NOT REALISTIC. AS REGARDS TIMING OF IMPLEMENTATION, THE SOVIET PROPOSAL APPARENTLY ENVISAGED WITHDRAWAL OF A TOTAL OF 40,000 MEN ON BOTH SIDES IN THE FIRST YEAR. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DO BETTER THAN THIS. SMIRNOVSKY SAID PARTICIPANTS SHOULD START WITH THE 40,000 WITHDRAWAL. FRG REP SAID IT WOULD TAKE LONGER TO REACH AGREEMENT IF THE SOVIET APPROACH WERE FOLLOWED. GDR REP SAID IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONTEMPLATE REDUCTION OF FOREIGN AND NATIONAL FORCES FROM THE OUTSET. SMIRNOVSKY INSISTED THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS REALISTIC.

55. US REP SAID HE WISHED TO RETURN TO SOME QUESTION HE HAD POSED EARLIER. HE ASKED WHETHER HIS EVALUATION WAS CORRECT THAT THE NUMBER OF SOVIET TANKS ENVISAGED FOR WITHDRAWAL IN BOTH THE ALLIED AND EASTERN APPROACHES WAS IN THE SAME ORDER OF DIMENSIONS AND WHETHER THE ALLIED FIGURE OF 1700 TANKS WAS APPROXIMATELY CORRECT. HE DID NOT POSE THIS

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QUESTION IN THE EFFORT TO OBTAIN CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION BUT IN THE EFFORT TO UNDERSTAND WHETHER THE PROPOSALS BOTH SIDES WERE TALKING ABOUT ENVISAGED ROUGHLY THE SAME SIZE OF GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS ON THE SOVIET SIDE. THE EASTERN REPS MIGHT BE OF THE VIEW THAT THE WESTERN PART OF THE EQUATION WAS NOT LARGE ENOUGH. BUT IF IT COULD AT LEAST BE ESTABLISHED THAT PARTICIPANTS WERE TALKING ABOUT ROUGHTLY THE SAME DIMENSIONS AS REGARDS SOVIET WITHDRAWALS, THIS WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT SIMILARITY, ONE THAT COULD BE BUILT ON. SO, WAS IT TRUE THAT PARTICIPANTS WERE TALKING ABOUT THE SAME DIMENSIONS OF REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET FORCES WHICH THE EAST WOULD BE READY TO WITHDRAW IF IT CONSIDERED THERE WERE AN ADEQUATE QUID PRO QUO? IF THIS DIE OF THE EQUATION COULD BE ESTABLISHED, IT WOULD MARK AN IMPORTANT ADVANCE.

56. KHLESTOV BROKE OFF FOR CONSULTATION WITH SMIRNOVSKY AND CONSULTED A REFERENCE DOCUMENT. HE SAID SOVIET REP WOULD CLARIFY THE QUESTION OF FIGURES IN THE FUTURE AFTER CHECKING, BUT THAT A 16 OR 17 PERCENT FIGURE WAS CORRECT AS REGARDS THE TOTAL FOR THE REDUCTIONS PROPOSED BY THE EAST.

57. US REP POINTED OUT THAT SOVIET REP HAD NOT ANSWERED HIS QUESTION. HE SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS ON THE NEXT OCCASION, SOVIET REPS WOULD FURTHER COMMENT ON THIS POINT.

58. US REP PROPOSED THAT MEETINGS FOR THE FOLLOWING WEEK TAKE PLACE ON MONDAY AND THURSDAY AFTERNOONS. HE SUGGESTED IN ADDITION THAT NOW THAT PARTICIPANTS WERE EMBARKED ON INFORMAL SESSIONS, IT WAS TIME TO DROP ONE OF THE PLENARY MEETINGS AND PROPOSED THAT THIS BE CONSIDERED FOR AT LEAST THE FOLLOWING WEEK. SOVIET REP SAID THEY WOULD CONSULT WITH THEIR COLLEAGUES AND RESPOND TO THIS SUGGESTION. HUMES UNQUOTE BROWN

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